In recent years, port wars have become one of the main axes of armed conflict in various countries of the Middle East, including Libya, Yemen, Syria, and Somalia. These ports play a prominent role on political, strategic, and economic levels. Ports have become an influential factor determining the paths of these conflicts, and recently, the aforementioned states have witnessed escalating military confrontations between their respective governments and armed terrorist groups. Consequently, both sides have attempted to control and extend their influence to these ports to achieve several strategic and economic gains.
In Yemen and Somalia, legitimate forces have gained control of those countries’ major ports, helping cut supply lines and funding sources for armed organizations. With respect to Libya, the Libyan army has taken control of several oil ports since September 2016, gradually doubling the country’s oil production. Assad’s Russian and Iranian allies have spread their influence across a number of ports, in an indication of their continuing aim to achieve economic and political gains.
It appears that the struggle over controlling these ports will continue, in light of the difficulty of reaching settlements for regional conflicts in the near future.
Different models
Actors involved in conflicts in the Middle East employ various tactics in order to gain control over major ports in a given country. The most prominent tactics of which are the following:
1. Mutual control: Somalia’s seaports represent a major, dynamic axis of the conflict that persists between Somalian army forces and African Union forces from one side, and Al-Shabaab on the other side. Recently, the armies of Somalia and African Union were able to defeat Al-Shabab in numerous confrontations, through which they were able to recapture most of the main ports in the country. The most important of which is the Barawa Port located 200km southwest of Mogadishu, retaken in October 2014.
However, with the restoration of the Al-Shabab military balance, the group was able to regain control of various ports, including the Jraad Port in the semiautonomous state of Puntland, located in northeastern Somalia, in March 2016.
2. Parallel paths: In light of increasing Libyan political division since 2014, two governments were formed - one in the East and another in the West - in addition to the Government of the National Accord (GNA), which falls within the framework of the Skhirat Agreement, signed in Morocco in 2015. Consequently, oil facilities, including export ports, have become a strategic target presiding the movements of military forces loyal to the governments. In this context, each party has attempted to control the oil exporting ports in order to tilt the balance of political and economic forces in their favor.
By the end of September 2016, Libyan National Army (LNA) forces loyal to the Eastern government moved to seize export ports in the oil crescent. In the operation “Sudden Lightening”. Throughout the operation, the forces were able to exert control over four strategic ports in the East including Ras Lanuf, Sidra, Brega, and Zueitina. Troops also handed over management of these ports to the National Oil Corporation in a move seemingly designed to dispel local and Western fears of the Libyan army violating the Skhirat agreement, and to sustain the neutrality of Libyan economic institutions.
3. Consolidating legitimacy: Yemeni legitimate forces strove to free Yemeni ports from Houthi militia, which took control of the capital of Sana’a in September 2014. During the last period, legitimate forces were able, with the support of the Arab coalition forces, to restore the ports of Aden, Brega, and most recently Mokha in the province of Taiz. They were also able to regain control of Mukalla and Al-Dhabba oil ports from Al-Qaeda in the city of Mukalla.
Without a doubt, this will support the ability of the legitimate and Arab coalition forces to control seaports in Yemen. In order for these forces to seize control fully over the ports, the forces will only remain to liberate Hodeidah and Salif. Certainly, legitimate forces and the Arab coalition gaining control over Yemeni ports is essential to secure navigation in the Gulf of Aden and Bab Al-Mendeb, in light of continuous threats from the Houthis.
4. Supporting influence: Recently, both Russia and Iran have invested their support for the Assad regime to achieve various strategic and economic gains. The most important of which was Iran announcing investing in the establishment of an oil port in January 2017. Many reports suggest that the port is likely to overlook the Mediterranean in accordance with a series of economic agreements signed by Iran and Syria in January 2017. Russia is also expected to establish a naval base in Syria’s Tartus for 49 years in an agreement signed between the two parties, also in January 2017.
Repercussions of conflicts
The previously mentioned developments have imposed numerous repercussions on the paths of conflicts of the Middle East, which can be addressed as follows:
1-Economic Returns: Most of the economic repercussions of the ongoing conflicts in the Middle East over ports negatively affected and obstructed the trade flow, resulting in the diminishing of exports to regional countries. The situation in Libya appears to be different. The Libyan Army control over all four petroleum ports in the region has fostered a recovery for the country’s production of petroleum. Oil production increased to 720,000 barrels per day in January 2017, the highest level since 2014. Meanwhile in Yemen, it is anticipated that legitimate forces’ control over seaports will help ease trade flow with the rest of the world in the future, which would ensure the safety and increase of oil exports through these ports.
2- Political Gains: Several players have resorted to utilizing their control over marine outlets to achieve political gains. For example, several western forces have anticipated that the Libyan Army will move to control the oil crescent ports. There is also the possibility of the army implementing amendments to the Sukhirat Agreement in order to form a unified government, where Khalifa Haftar would be the Commander General of the Libyan Army.
3- Strategic importance: It is expected that the legitimate forces’ influence over Yemeni seaports will help curb ongoing Houthi and Iranian threats to marine traffic in the Gulf of Aden and Bab Al-Mendeb, especially in light of the current escalation between Iran and the United States.
4- Cutting financial support: It is also apparent that the legitimate forces’ control over Yemeni seaports will play a pivotal role in cutting supply routes to the Houthis, who have relied on them primarily to gain access to arms and reinforcements from Iran. Thus, the legitimate forces’ control over these ports represents an important step in enforcing further restraints on financing the Houthi. Similarly, the Somali Army’s control over seaports in the nation would be a starting point towards drying up financing sources for Al-Shabab, which relies on exporting coal via those countries’ seaports.
Potential Paths
The latest developments indicate government forces’ success in regaining control of seaports from armed organizations, but this has not settled the battle in their favour. This is specifically evident in Somalia, where seaports are still an easy target for Al-Shabab, due to the Somali Army’s lack of military capabilities. However, it is clear that the balance of military strength has leaned in favour of the Libyan National Army and legitimate forces in Yemen. Along these lines, there is an increasing possibility that both sides will be able to preserve their gains in the immediate future, and even perhaps make further progress in regaining control of the remainder of seaports under the control of armed organizations.
Finally, we can say that seaports in the Middle East have become a key point that various actors have utilized to settle clashes in various countries, rendering them a strategic target to be protected throughout the aforementioned clashes.
